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1. Introduction 
Clark et al. (2007) have pointed out that the literature on estimation of the determinants of 
migration is surprisingly short. We try to improve this literature in three ways for regressions for 
net immigration flows (immigration minus emigration). (i) Recent data on migration stocks in six 
OECD countries by country of origin make it possible to include stocks into migration 
regressions. This has not been done so far. It allows us to show that there may be threshold 
values in the migration stock variable in regard to net immigration for developing countries. (ii) 
There are only a few papers (Mayda 2007, Naudé 2008, Ziesemer 2008a, b) on net immigration 
of developing countries that use lagged dependent variables and the adequate dynamic panel data 
method dealing with it. In Mayda’s paper on bilateral data the only regressor that survives the 
introduction of the lagged dependent variable is the income difference between destination and 
origin countries. Naudé (2008) and Ziesemer (2008a, b) find significantly negative coefficients 
of lagged dependent variables without employing migration stock data. We employ lagged 
dependent flows, migration stocks and other variables and show that the sign of the lagged 
dependent variable remains negative. (iii) There are only two papers (Ziesemer 2008a, b) that use 
remittances as a regressor although ‘… direct returns to the nonmigrating family from the 
migration of a family member are his or her remittances.’ (Stark and Bloom 1985). We show that 
remittances also play a significant role when the regressors mentioned before and savings as an 
indicator of wealth are statistically significant. (iv) Non-linearities appear when only economic 
variables are included. (v) When including also variables of disasters, conflict and political 
instability some of the nonlinearities vanish.     
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2. Empirical and theoretical considerations regarding related literature 
In this section we briefly motivate the regressors used when explaining net immigration of 
developing countries. The most frequently used variable in migration regressions is the income 
or wage difference between areas of destination and origin since Todaro (1969). The income 
difference is the incentive to migrate. The researchers’ problem of not knowing the country of 
destination is often circumvented by using the income of the USA or the OECD as a proxy.1 Of 
course, many migrants go to other countries than those of the OECD, but OECD countries are 
the end of the chain of destinations such as those from Pakistan to India to the USA, or from 
Latin American countries via Mexico to the USA, or from the former USSR to Poland and 
Hungary and from there to Western European countries (see Ratha and Shaw 2007). The income 
differential has been used by Rotte et al. (1997) for migration of asylum seekers to Germany 
from 17 countries, 1985-1994; by Vogler and Rotte (2000) for migration from 86 Asian and 
African countries to Germany, 1981-1995; by Clark et al. (2002, 2004, 2007) for migration from 
81 countries to the USA, 1971-1998; by Pedersen et al. (2006) for the migration of 129 source 
countries to 26 OECD countries. The wage difference has been used by Hatton and Williamson 
(2003) for net-out-migration from 21 African countries 1977-1995.    
   Lagged dependent flow variables in migration regressions have been used to proxy for the 
stock of migrants and the size of the network for which no data were available. They are 
considered to be a weak substitute for the availability of stock data. When stock variables were 
included the sign of the lagged dependent variable was positive (see Hatton 1995, for UK 
emigration data 1870-1913). In Naudé (2008) and Ziesemer (2008a, b) the sign of the lagged 
dependent migration flow variable of developing countries is negative, but they do not include 
                                                 
1
 With the better availability of bilateral data this can be improved. But bilateral data are not available for example 
for remittances. They are currently constructions transforming balance of payments data of countries into bilateral 
information by use of models (see Ratha and Shaw 2007).   
7 
stock variables. This raises the question whether or not it will remain negative when stock 
variables are included to indicate the network effect and the lagged dependent variable may 
reflect the effect of behaviour after having helped a migrant earlier? After having helped 
migrants five years earlier, the network is larger if it did not shrink for other reasons (see Light et 
al. 1993) and therefore could help more people migrating. But financial means of those who did 
help may be more stressed and the necessity to migrate may also be negatively correlated with 
those five years earlier. Thus, the expected sign is a priori unclear.    
   The modern theory of migration has argued that one of the major motives for migration is the 
avoidance of capital market imperfections (Rapoport and Docquier 2006). Remittances are 
compensation or return to those family members left behind in the country of origin. One of the 
intentions of the family that sends a migrant is to use the remittances to finance investment and 
consumption expenditures at home. Moreover, remittances serve as source of foreign exchange 
(Massey 1988) and diversify against income risk Massey (1993). Therefore remittances should 
have the effect to allow family members either to stay at home and invest there or to finance 
other family members’ migration using remittances besides domestic income or savings. If the 
first of these ideas dominates, the expected sign is positive for the regression of net immigration 
of the country of origin on remittances.  If the second one dominates we expect a negative impact 
of remittances on net immigration. 
   Migration generates costs paid from wages, other income or wealth (cumulated savings). Based 
on economic theorizing one would expect that wealth is used to finance migration transaction 
costs whenever income is insufficient to cover them. As we use income already in the difference 
with destination countries’ income it turned out to be highly insignificant when added to the 
regressions. We add savings here as a proxy of wealth because all other variants of (cumulated) 
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savings have turned out to be insignificant. The individual decision of selling life stock before 
the migration – frequently cited in the household panel data literature - will not appear in the 
macro data because the buyer may reduce her savings by the same amount that the seller 
increases them through the mutation. In short, other versions of (cumulated) savings are not 
significant and income variables are correlated with the income difference variable.     
  The central task of networks of migrants is to help migrants reducing the cost of their 
migration. To be successful in doing so it might be necessary for the network to have a certain 
size. For this size the stock of migrants in the six OECD countries of destination is used as an 
indicator. However, this may also hold for return migration and the question then is which effect 
is stronger and for which we perhaps have a threshold. Again, the sign of the variable is a priori 
unclear. Similarly, Rotte et al. (1997) and Vogler and Rotte (2000) use the stock of the 
population from the sending country in Germany. Other papers have not used this variable yet, 
but rather they use the stock of migrants in the destination country by country of origin (see 
Hatton and Williamson 2005, Clark et al. 2002, 2004, 2007). We add the stock of migrants in the 
developing countries. We also use variables for disasters, conflicts and political instability in 
order to capture forced migration. In economic and econometric ex-ante considerations these 
latter variables are part of the residuals. It may be interesting though to look at their effects ex-
post. 
   The regression equation we get from this line of thought is as follows:  
nm/l = c1 + c2nm(-5)/l(-5) + c3(log(oec)-log(gdppc)) + c4wr/gdp + c5savgdp + c6migst/l + c7sm/l 
+ c8dta/l +c9fdph/l +c10fdps/l + c11d(log(pol)) +c12d(bdhi-bdlo) + u   (1) 
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nm is net migration, l the labour force, oec the GDP per capita of the OECD countries, gdppc 
that of the developing country, savgdp the percentage of gross savings as a share of GDP 
multiplied by hundred, wr worker remittances, migst the stock of migrants in the six OECD 
countries by country of origin, sm the international stock of migrants in the developing country, 
dta the number of persons totally affected by disasters, fdph and fdps the forcibly displaced 
persons coming to (home) and stemming from (source) the developing country, pol an indicator 
of the political situation in the country, bdhi and bdlo the number of battle deaths from high and 
low estimates respectively and u a residual.2 In order to correct for country size we express some 
of the variables as percentage of the GDP or of the labour force. More lags, logs and squares and 
other variants of specifications are indicated in Table1 containing the results. 
  
3. Data and econometric method 
We take the economic data from the World Development Indicators. The only exception are the 
Worldbank data on migrations stocks in six OECD countries (USA, Canada, Australia, UK, 
France and Germany) named Docquier (1975-2000)3. These stock data are only rough proxies 
for the migration stocks by country of origin because many other countries of destination host 
migrants as well. Data of net immigration flows of and international migration stocks in the 
developing countries are estimated by the United Nations Population Division and are available 
for five year intervals. In the World Development Indicators these data appear as absolute 
numbers requiring correction for country size. We express migrants as a share of the labour 
force, because more than 75% of those going to the USA are in the age group of 14-65 (Clark et 
                                                 
2
 Naudé (2008) uses number of disasters rather than number of people affected and instead of battle deaths he uses 
number of years of conflicts. We think that the seriousness of the events is taken into account better in the variants 
of the variables we use.   
3
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/Docquier_1975-
2000_data_Panel.xls.  
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al. 2004). Worker remittances received are from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook and contain payments to workers who are (intended to be) employed for more than 
one year. GDP per capita data in constant US dollars with the base year 2000 stem from the 
National Accounts. Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, 
plus net transfers and net factor income from abroad. 
   The CRED EM-DAT4 database provides data for the total number of people affected by 
disasters, dta. Types of disasters included are complex disasters, drought, earthquake (seismic 
activity), epidemic, extreme temperature, flood,  industrial accident, insect infestation, mass 
movement dry, mass movement wet, miscellaneous accident, storm, transport accident, volcano, 
wildfire. 
   Data on forcibly displaced persons by home and source, fdph and fdps, are available from the 
Centre for Systemic Peace.5 There also the polityIV data are available, which attribute a value of 
-10 to +10 to every country-year situation for the indicator polity2, pol. 
   Data on high and low estimates of the number of battle deaths by country and year, bdhi and 
bdlo, are taken from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).6    
   We estimate the migration regressions for three samples of countries (excluding OECD 
countries), those above $1200 and those below it, and a joint sample (see appendix for the names 
of the countries). These groups have performed quite differently in the past. The richer sample 
had growth rates of the GDP per capita above 2% and therefore higher ones than the OECD and 
the poorer sample had growth rates below 1% and was therefore diverging from the OECD. 
                                                 
4
 http://www.emdat.be/. Emergency Events Database of Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 
5
 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (see Marshall and Jaggers 2009). There we also found data on major 
episodes of political violence (MEPV) from ethnic, civil and international conflicts. The indicators actotal and 
totalac are aggregates form subcomponents which have been given values from 1 to 10 (see Marshall 2009) . They 
are highly correlated with the data on forcibly displaced persons and with the number of battle deaths and therefore 
will not appear in the regressions shown. Similarly, we could not find any effect for refugees by country of origin 
and country of asylum, probably because they are included in the international stock of migrants.   
6
 http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ 
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Moreover, the poorer countries may have more emigration when getting richer, whereas the 
richer countries may be expected to have less (see Clark et al. 2007). 
   Because migration data are available only in five year intervals we will have a time dimension 
of only four or five periods. For dynamic panels with a relatively short time dimension the 
preferred method is the system GMM estimator, with or without the use of the orthogonal 
deviation method of Arellano-Bover (1995).7 The latter is a variant of a systems GMM estimator, 
which uses one equation in levels and replaces the first difference equation of the systems GMM 
estimator by orthogonal deviations. Instruments are listed in the appendix. 
   The migration stock data are available for six five-year periods, from 1975 to 2000. As we will 
use five and ten years lags and the orthogonal deviation methods takes another five-year lag, the 
time dimension will ultimately be reduced to three periods. This then covers the period 1990-
2000. This is a fairly ‘normal’ period after the ‘lost decade’ following the 1981-83 debt crisis 
and before the crises of the second millennium, the ICT bust and the financial crisis of 2007-
2009.8 Because of missing data in the unbalanced panel the number of countries is fairly small. It 
has decreased from 52 and 56 respectively to merely 18 for each sample. Therefore we also 
estimate the migration regression for the joint sample. The two small samples can also be seen as 
a disaggregation of the large ones. As they all have similar results this indicates also their 
robustness. As the results are very similar for all three samples, we run the regressions with the 
data for disaster, conflict and political instability only for the large sample. In economic ex-ante 
considerations one would take these events as shocks and leave them in the residuals. In ex-post 
analyses though one may want to see what their impact on migration was. Therefore regressions 
                                                 
7
 See also Baltagi (2008, chap.8). 
8
 By implication, other studies often covering longer periods can do so if they do not employ lagged dependent 
variables and the even further lagged instruments, which costs two 5-year observations and if they do not use the 
migration stocks in the six OECD countries which are available not since 1960 but only since 1975. 
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1 to 3 in Table 1 show only economic arguments, whereas regression 4 includes a variable for 
disasters and regression 5 variables of conflict and political instability.        
 
4. Results  
We interpret the results for the first three regressions using only economic variables in Table 1 as 
follows. The lagged dependent variable has a negative sign although we have included the 
migration stock variable. This result has also been found by Naudé (2008) for net immigration of 
Sub-Saharan African countries, and in Ziesemer (2008a, b) for net immigration into developing 
countries with GDP per capita below $1200 (at price as of 2000); neither of these authors uses 
migrations stocks as an additional regressor though.  
   The income difference has a negative impact on net immigration (see Figure A1) until the 
income ratio of the OECD and the sample average is about 37 in the poor sample (which is 
outside the sample), 61 in the rich sample, and 103 in the joint sample. Here the incentive is 
likely to be large enough and additional increases do not make a difference. This point is reached 
earlier the poorer people are. Obviously there is some heterogeneity here among the country 
groups with non-linearities allowing the large sample to have values outside the range of those of 
the smaller samples, more similar to an envelope rather than an average of the sub-sample. All 
papers using this argument mentioned in section 2 use a linear version of it and find the expected 
sign.  
   Worker remittances have a positive long term impact on net immigration until they reach a 
value of 6.1% for the poor sample and 7.4% for the rich sample and 10.3% for the total sample 
(see Figure A2). These values are below the panel average plus one standard deviation. Motives 
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for staying at home and financing expenditures dominate until these values, but beyond these 
values remittances support emigration.  
   Savings ratios have a negative impact on net immigration, and more strongly so in poorer 
countries. In less poor countries this effect is relatively small though.  
   Migration stocks in the six OECD countries have an S-shaped impact on net immigration (see 
Figure A3). They first decrease net immigration to a decreasing extent. The minimum value 
occurs at 2% of the migrant stock as a share of the domestic labour force for the poor sample, at 
7.1% for the rich sample and at 10.35% for the large sample. As the panel average of the 
migration stock is 2% for the small and 8.7% for the richer sample,9 we can roughly say that in 
the neighborhood of the average sample value there is a turning point or threshold value for the 
migration stock to support net immigration, perhaps through return migration. The second 
turning point or maximum of the S-shaped curve is at a value of 5% for the poor countries where 
increases in migration stocks reduce net immigration again (most of the data are below a value of 
0.1). For the less poor sample and the total sample this is at 51% and 53% respectively, which is 
still within the sample and perhaps indicates that the cubic term is more than just a smoothing of 
the quadratic term. Qualitatively results are similar, but quantitatively they differ quite a bit 
between poor and less poor countries.10 Rotte et al. (1997) find a negative sign of the size of 
population from sending countries in Germany in a paper with 17 sending countries, whereas 
                                                 
9
 The panel average of the migration stocks as a percentage of the labour force of the country of origin is 2% for the 
small and 8.7% for the richer and 5% for the large sample. The standard deviation is 7.65%, 14% and 11.8% 
respectively. The maximum values are 85%, 77% and 85% respectively.  
10
 Hatton and Williamson (2005; Table 2.5) for net immigration, 1970-2000, in a regression for 80 countries, some 
of which are developed countries, and Clark et al. (2002, 2004, 2007) for migration into the USA from 81 countries, 
1971-1998  also use a migration stock variable. But whereas ours is the stock of migrants in the six OECD countries 
with origin in a developing country, they use the stock of migrants in the developing country born in a different 
country, which we will use in regressions 4 and 5. They find a linear, positive and linear-quadratic inverted u-shape 
respectively. 
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Vogler and Rotte (2000) find a positive sign in a paper with 86 sending countries. Such change 
in sign is suggestive of trying exponential terms as we did. 
   Regression 4 shows that the total number affected by people during disasters has a negative 
impact on net immigration, but to a decreasing extent as expressed by the quadratic term. In the 
neighbourhood of the average value for the number of affected people the sign switches and we 
get a negative impact, perhaps because more restrictive policies set in when numbers get higher. 
We also add the international stock of migrants in the developing country here. The combination 
of the quadratic and the cubic term lead to a positive but decreasing effect of international stock 
of migrants in the developing countries on net immigration. Probably this variable comes closest 
to capturing network effects. In comparison with the previous regressions, one consequence of 
adding these two variables is that ten-year lags of worker remittances get so highly insignificant 
that we have taken them out. Therefore eight other countries enter the regression (see the list of 
countries in the appendix and the detailed description of how samples change between 
regressions 3, 4 and 5). These countries have strongly negative net immigration, which pulls 
down the curve corresponding to Figure 3A, and the sum of linear coefficients gets positive. 
With more observations with net immigration far below the average, therefore the lower part of 
the S-curve is absent and only a time lag effect which is first negative and then positive is present 
in the enlarged sample. This is an implication of the fact that for S-curve effects one needs a 
panel with countries equally frequently represented in all the parts of the S-curve.  
   In regression 5 we add the number of forcibly displaced persons when the developing country 
is the source and when it is the home of these persons. As expected, when the country is the 
source of the displacement this decreases net immigration and when it is the home this increases 
the net immigration. For the polity variable, the level does not matter but the rate of change does. 
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The positive change in the political situation seems to give some hope that the situation gets 
better in the future. The data for the variable are between -0.2 and +0.2. The panel average of this 
is close to zero. The resulting inverted u-shape shows a positive effect on net immigration until 
the growth rate of the polity variable is 5%; then the marginal impact gets negative. The last 
variable that matters is the difference between the growth rates of the high and the low estimate 
of battle deaths. This has a negative impact on the net immigration. We interpret the variable as a 
larger uncertainty about the number of battle death persons. If people have the same estimates as 
the scientists making the estimates, the increase in uncertainty plausibly reduces net immigration. 
In comparison to the previous regression the disaster variable becomes highly insignificant and 
therefore is dropped. Another major impact is that the quadratic and the cubic term of the 
migration stocks in the six OECD countries are no longer significant. The linear negative current 
effect and the positive lagged term remain intact though. The linear negative current effect and 
the positive lagged term remain intact though. The impact of the international stock of migrants 
in the developing countries, sm, on net immigration reaches a peak at 7% now, which is half the 
value of the previous regression, but this non-linearity remains intact as well.  
    
5. Conclusion 
We have presented some new empirical results. The negative sign of lagged net immigration 
flows show that migration dynamics have strong self-stabilizing forces which work against the 
strong incentive for migration from income differences between rich and poor countries. The S-
shaped impact of larger migration stocks in six OECD countries on migration shows that 
networks first support emigration and later slow it down and perhaps support return migration 
and support emigration again at high values, implying two thresholds. But this result is highly 
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sensitive to the inclusion of other variables. For policy conclusions the result in regard to 
remittances is important. If lower taxes and fees on remittances provide an incentive to enhance 
remittances they increase net immigration (and vice versa) for values of remittances as a share of 
GDP below the average plus one half standard deviation. The international stock of migrants in 
the developing countries has an inverted u-shape impact on net immigration.  
   When adding variables for disasters, conflicts and political instability, we find an inverted u-
shape impact for the total number of people affected by disasters, or, alternatively, (i) a normal 
effect of forcibly displace persons; (ii) an inverted u-shape in the percentage change of the polity 
variable and (iii) a negative impact of more uncertainty about the number of battle deaths.  With 
the exception of some non-linearity results the economic effects of the first three regressions are 
persistent to the introduction of variables for disaster, conflict and political instability. At times 
of conflicts and disasters they are dominated by the latter.    
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Table A1: Results for migration regressions 
    
Dependent variable: Net immigration as percent of the labour force, nm/L 
 
Regressors  Poor 
sample 
Less 
poor 
Large 
sample 
Large 
sample 
Large 
sample 
NM(-5)/L(-5) -0.314 -0.341 -0.298 -0.242 -0.345 
 -0.0196 0.0000 0.0224 0.0075 0.000 
LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC) -3.393 -0.314 -0.300 -0.371 -0.151 
 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.028 0.008 
(LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))^2 0.818 0.038 0.032 0.085 0.021 
 0.009 0.042 0.032 0.084 0.007 
(LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))^3 -0.064 - - -0.006462 - 
 0.003 - - 0.1577 - 
WR/GDP 2.077 - - - - 
 0.004 - - - - 
(WR/GDP)^2 -24.262 - 2.062 1.435 1.076 
 0.016 - 0.183 0.005 0.133 
WR(-5)/GDP(-5) - 2.571 1.845 0.484 0.581 
 - 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.029 
(WR(-5)/GDP(-5))^2 22.007 -17.395 -13.903 - - 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - 
WR(-10)/GDP(-10) 3.171 - - - - 
 0.000 - - - - 
(WR(-10)/GDP(-10))^2 -40.594 - 2.875 - - 
 0.000 - 0.042 - - 
SAVGDP(-2) - 0.0036 - - - 
 - 0.0051 - - - 
SAVGDP(-3) -0.002 -0.0037 -0.001 -0.0014 -0.001 
 0.000 0.009 -1.872 0.0001 0.072 
MIGST/L - -2.690 -3.304 -2.220 -0.832 
 - 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.003 
MIGST(-5)/L(-5) -10.661 2.396 2.839 2.690 1.196 
 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.0003 0.000 
(MIGST/L)^2 153.694 4.730 5.323 3.063 - 
 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.026 - 
(MIGST(-5)/L(-5))^2 208.278 -2.380 -2.640 -2.692 - 
 0.010 0.000 0.000 0 - 
(MIGST/L)^3 3100.415 -2.691 -2.827 - - 
 0.062 0.010 0.002 - - 
(SM(-5)/L(-5))^2 - - - 0.418 0.477 
 - - - 0.000 0.000 
(SM/L)^3 - - - -0.185 -0.468 
 - - - 0.000 0.010 
DTA/L - - - -0.176 - 
 - - - 0.067 - 
(DTA/L)^2 - - - 0.278 - 
 - - - 0.160 - 
FDPS/L - - - - -685.935 
 - - - - 0.000 
FDPH/L - - - - 430.608 
 - - - - 0.149 
D(LOG(100+POL)) - - - - 1.667 
 - - - - 0.011 
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D(LOG(100+POL))^2 - - - - -19.201 
 - - - - 0.009 
D(LOG(1+BDHI))-D(LOG(1+BDLO)) 
- - - - -0.004 
 - - - - 0.009 
 
    
 
Table A1 continued 
   
 
 
Period 1990-
2000 
1990-
2000 
1990-
2000 
1990-
2000 
1990-2000 
Countries 18 18 35 43 39 
Observations 34 39 73 97 91 
S.E. of regression 0.009 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.019 
J-statistic 10.500 18.980 26.208 22.186 23.322 
Instrument rank 26 29 29 39 39 
Sargan-Hansen p-value 0.57 0.33 0.051 0.51 0.5 
p-values below coefficients      
Transformation: Orthogonal Deviations.    
  
2SLS instrument weighting matrix    
  
Cross-section weights (PCSE)   
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Appendix: Countries in the samples 
   Countries with GDP per capita above $1200 (2000) for which we have observations in the 
regressions presented in Table 1 are: 
Belize, Brazil, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey.   
   Countries with GDP per capita below $1200 (2000) for which we have observations in the 
regressions presented in Table 1 are:  
Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu. 
   The large sample consists of all countries listed in the two groups above. 
Both samples originally consisted of more than 50 countries defined by the availability of having 
data for remittances, aid and GDP. But for this regression there are only a limited number of 
observations available making the actual samples much smaller. 
   Countries in regression 4 but not in regression 3: Cape Verde, Algeria, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Namibia, Rwanda, Yemen.  
   Countries in regression 4 but not in regression 5: Belarus, Cape Verde, Malta, Vanuatu.       
   Countries in regression 5 but not in 3: Algeria, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Yemen.  
   Countries in regression 3 but not in 5: Belarus, Malta, Vanuatu. 
Some of the six countries which are in regressions 4 and 5 but not in 3, do not follow the 
standard pattern of having strongly negative net immigration first and then much less negative or 
even positive net immigration: Namibia, Rwanda and Ecuador. They first have four or seven 
periods with about zero net immigration.  
 
Appendix: Instruments  
When two lags are mentioned, this indicates the first and the last lag used for dynamic 
instruments. One lag indicates just a traditional instrument.  
   Instrument list for the poor sample: NM(-10)/L(-10), NM(-15)/L(-15),  
((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC)),-1,-1), ((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))2,-1,-1),  
((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))3,-1,-1), (WR(-1)/GDP(-1)), ((WR/GDP)2,-1,-2), WR(-10)/GDP(-10), 
(WR(-5)/GDP(-5))2, (WR(-10)/GDP(-10))2,  SAVGDP(-3), (MIGST(-5)/L(-5)), (MIGST(-5)/L(-5))2, 
(MIGST(-10)/L(-10))2, (MIGST(-5)/L(-5))3. 
   Instrument list for the less poor sample: NM(-10)/L(-10), ((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC)),-1,-3), 
((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))2,-1,-3), WR(-5)/GDP(-5), (WR(-5)/GDP(-5))2, (WR(-10)/GDP(-10))2, 
SAVGDP(-2), SAVGDP(-3), MIGST(-5)/L(-5), MIGST(-10)/L(-10), (MIGST(-5)/L(-5))2,  
(MIGST(-10)/L(-10))2, (MIGST(-5)/L(-5))3. 
  Instrument list for the large sample (regression 3): NM(-10)/L(-10), NM(-15)/L(-15),  
((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC)),-1,-2), ((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))2,-1,-2), ((WR/GDP)2,-1,-2),  
(WR(-5)/GDP(-5)), (WR(-5)/GDP(-5))2, (WR(-10)/GDP(-10))2, SAVGDP(-3), MIGST(-5)/L(-5), 
MIGST(-10)/L(-10), (MIGST(-5)/L(-5))2, (MIGST(-10)/L(-10))2, (MIGST(-5)/L(-5))3.  
   Instrument list for large sample (regression 4):  
NM(-15)/L(-15), ((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC)),-2,-4), ((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))2,-2,-3), 
((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))3,-2,-3), (WR/GDP)2,-2,-3), (WR(-5)/GDP(-5)), SAVGDP(-3), 
MIGST(-5)/L(-5), MIGST(-10)/L(-10), (MIGST(-5)/L(-5))2, (MIGST(-10)/L(-10))2, (MIGST(-
5)/L(-5))3, (SM(-10)/L(-10))2, (SM(-5)/L(-5))3, DTA(-2)/L(-2), (DTA(-2)/L(-2))2.   Instrument 
list for large sample (regression5):  
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NM(-15)/L(-15), ((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC)),-2,-5), ((LOG(OEC)-LOG(GDPPC))2,-2,-4),  
(WR(-5)/GDP(-5)), ((WR/GDP)2,-2,-3), SAVGDP(-3), MIGST(-5)/L(-5),  
MIGST(-10)/L(-10), (SM(-10)/L(-10))2, (SM(-5)/L(-5))3, FDPS(-1)/L(-1), FDPH(-1)/L(-1),         
D(LOG(100+POL(-1))), D(LOG(100+POL(-1)))2,  
D(LOG(1+BDHI(-1)))-D(LOG(1+BDLO(-1))).
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Appendix:  
Figures of non-linear partial regression impacts within the data range 
 
53.752.51.250
2
0
-2
-4
log(oec)-log(gdppc)
nm/l
 
 
Figure A1: The impact of income differences on net immigration: The lowest curve is for the 
poor sample, the highest for the rich sample. 
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Figure A2: Impact of remittances on net immigration: The steepest curve is for the poor sample, 
the flattest for the large sample. 
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Figure A3a: The impact of the OECD-6 migration stock on net immigration: The higher curve 
(until 0.72) represents the less poor sample and the lower curve the large sample. 
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Figure A3b: The impact of the OECD-6 migration stock on net immigration in the poor sample. 
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